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10/26/11
Bus
254: Macroeconomics
1b. Question1b: (20 points) Financial Crisis.
During the early 21st
century easy access to credit along with low rates on mortgages gave more
people the possibility of owning a home. After the recession of 2001 the
Federal Reserve enacted a policy aimed at stimulating the economy which leads
to the lower mortgage rates. With easy credit and low rates people bought
houses, causing home prices to rise and for new house construction to reach all
time highs. From 2000 – 2006 U.S. home prices rose 10% a year on average.
The
securitization of mortgages had helped fuel the housing boom due to its rapid
growth. Securitization of mortgages is the act of bundling of mortgages into
securities that then are sold to investors and traded in financial markets.
Securitization of low-risk mortgages has existed for many years and has expanded
the market, making it easier for investors to hold mortgages. Unfortunately in
the early 2000s riskier mortgages were securitized in huge amounts. The riskier
mortgages included subprime mortgages; a subprime mortgage is made to borrowers
with low credit scores. When subprime borrowers defaulted on their mortgages
during the housing boom the lender could easily refinance or sell the property
to avoid a default. With high profits and low defaults investors and lenders
became complacent in the mortgage-backed securities market. With increased compliancy
underwriting standards dropped lenders demanded little or no down payment or
documentation. Ratings agencies gave investors reassurance by rating
mortgage-backed securities as low risk.
As
new houses came into the market people realized that home prices could no rise
forever. In 2006 home prices began to falter than fell sharply. With home
prices falling sales and construction came to an immediate halt. For new home
owners and people who refinanced their home value fell below what they
currently owed on their mortgage. Subprime borrowers began to fall behind in
mortgage payments which eventually this spread to prime mortgages made to
people with high credit scores.
As
delinquencies started to increase it became clear that residential mortgages
were much more volatile than people had assumed. As the market imploded the
level of expected losses rose dramatically. Due to the millions of U.S.
mortgages repackaged as securities the losses spread around the world. In the
early part of the housing bust the International Monetary Fund estimated
worldwide losses to be $240 billion, in April 2009 that estimate climbed to
$1.4 trillion.
As
estimates for mortgage-related losses rose, investors and financial
institutions became nervous over their risk as well as the risk of others.
Anxiety increased because of the difficulty to determine the value of many
loans and mortgage-backed securities. The complexity of financial instruments
increased the vulnerability of financial institutions to losses. Businesses
became reluctant to lend to each other. In 2007 fears about the financial
health of other firms led to huge disruptions in lending. Institutions used the
lending market to fund day-to-day needs for cash. With firms reluctant to lend
rates on short-term loans increased sharply compared to overnight federal funds
rate.
The
fall of 2008 saw the failure of two large financial institutions Lehman
Brothers and Washington Mutual. American Insurance Group as well as several
others also threatened to fail. With some many institutions connected in a
large complex web the failure of one could start a cascade of losses all
through the financial system. A large money market mutual fund incurred
sizeable losses which extended the crisis to a section of the financial system
thought to be safe. The losses lead investors to pull their money out of the
market. Short-term debt securities for corporations froze due to declining
confidence. With confidence in the financial sector heading south the stock
prices of financial institutions around the world fell off a cliff. The global
financial system found itself on the brink of a meltdown.
The
Federal Reserve took action to prevent a full meltdown of the financial system.
With short-term markets freezing up the Federal Reserve expanded its own
collateralized lending to financial institutions to make sure there was access too
much needed funding for day-to-day operations. Under normal conditions the
Federal Reserve only loans to institutions that take deposits through a process
known as discount lending. During the collapse of confidence in 2008 investment
banks also had difficulty in obtaining short-term funding making them
vulnerable to credit cutoffs resembling bank runs. In March 2008 the Federal
Reserve created two programs to provide short-term secured loans to primary
dealer similar to discount-window loans.
Bear
Stearns in 2008 was close to failure, its failure would have created a domino
effect that would have disrupted the markets severely. The Federal Reserve
attempted to contain the damage by facilitating the purchase of Bear Stearns by
JP Morgan Chase. The Reserve provided loans backed by specific Bear Stearns
assets. Within several months the investment bank Leman Brothers collapsed due
to no private company willing to acquire the troubled investment bank. The
Federal Reserve did not issue direct loans to Lehman due to a lack of
collateral. The failure of Lehman resulted in a financial panic which
threatened to spread to several key financial institutions, including American
International Group which is a large insurance company. AIG was central to
guaranteeing financial instruments its failure could have lead to a cascading
effect of failures and cause a meltdown of the global financial system. To
protect the global financial system the Federal Reserve provided secured loans
to AIG.
In
response to the financial crisis the U.S. government passed the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The reform act establishes the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection; the bureau has authority over a range
of financial services providers. The mission is to ensure that people are
treated in a fair and transparent way in the financial marketplace. The bureaus
director will be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the
bureau will be autonomous within the Federal Reserve.
The
financial reform legislation requires regulators to focus on the entire
interconnected system instead on individual firms. This new perspective is
known as a macro-prudential view. The legislation gives the Reserve the power
to act when a group of institutions practices create risk within the financial
system. In order to properly understand the possible risks regulators need to
collect accurate and up-to-date information on the interconnections of
financial firms.
In
recent decades there has developed a banking system that is less rigorously
regulated. During the crisis this unregulated system was vulnerable to panics
and was a major source of credit-market disruption. The Dodd-Frank legislation
attempts to remove regulation gaps by focusing oversight on how the firm
functions and its level of risk to the economy. The act creates a Financial
Stability Oversight Council to watch the overall risks within the financial
system and the broad economy. Federal Reserve has been given authority to
regulate all systemically important financial institutions, even non-banks.